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The global financial crisis of 2008 has had a profound impact on 
the conceptions that have informed economic and financial 
frameworks on the national and global level.  Policymakers now 
believe that unregulated financial innovation is highly suspect.  
Economic and financial deregulation no longer enjoys an exalted 
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status.  The efficient market hypothesis has come under fire.1  The 
flaws of global standard setting, such as the capital adequacy 
standards promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, have been exposed.2 
The crisis has also ruptured the global economic order.  The United 
States and Europe, the rulers of the order since World War II, have 
struggled to recover from the crisis.  By contrast, most emerging and 
developing economies rebounded relatively quickly over the past 
year.3  More importantly, as the title of this Symposium suggests, the 
crisis created an opportunity for emerging economies to join the table 
where global economic policy is decided.  As the Symposium’s title 
also suggests, this opportunity is about “voice”—i.e., effective and 
meaningful representation of emerging and developing economies at 
the table (actually “tables”—the various fora that discuss and agree 
upon global economic and financial policy). 
One might quibble, however, with the Symposium title’s reference 
to “new” voices.  While it is true that the voices of emerging 
economies are new to the extent that no such voices existed when the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 1944, 
developing countries were present at the negotiations that led to the 
creation of the IMF and the World Bank (Bretton Woods Institutions).  
Moreover, developing countries were the instigators of the push for a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s.  Thus, prior 
to the global financial crisis, industrialized countries heard the voices 
of developing countries.  But they ignored them.  So to the extent that 
developing and emerging economies lacked effective and meaningful 
voice in the global economic order, they were voiceless. 
This Article provides an account of the evolution of developing 
and emerging economies’ voice, focusing primarily on the IMF.  Part 
I addresses the role of developing countries in the establishment of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions in 1944 at the Bretton Woods 
Conference, noting that the main players at the conference, the United 
 
1 See generally JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF 
RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009). 
2 See generally DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION (2008). 
3 The difference between emerging and developing economies is often blurred.  For 
purposes of this Article, an emerging economy differs from a developing country to the 
extent that the former has undertaken significant economic reforms that are transforming it 
into a fast-growing, dynamic economy with a regional and even global economic presence.  
See Chuan Li, What Are Emerging Markets?, in E-BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & 
DEVELOPMENT (Enrique Carrasco ed., 2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/faq 
_docs/emerging_markets.shtml. 
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States and the United Kingdom, marginalized development issues.  
Part II focuses on the NIEO, an unsuccessful post-decolonization 
movement that sought to give developing countries a meaningful 
voice in international economic matters, including demands to give 
developing countries more influence in the Bretton Woods 
Institutions.  Part III chronicles the rise of IMF structural 
conditionality in the 1980s, a tool the Fund used to impose neoliberal 
reforms on developing and transitioning countries.  The Fund’s use of 
structural conditionality reached absurd levels in the Asian financial 
crisis of the late 1990s, triggering criticisms that countries borrowing 
from the IMF lacked ownership over the reforms—i.e., they were 
voiceless.  Although the Fund revised the conditionality guidelines in 
2002 to require “parsimony,” the revisions were ineffective. 
Part IV explains how the global financial crisis of 2008 has finally 
given “emerging economies”—which did not exist in 1944—at least 
an opportunity to acquire what could become a significant voice in 
international monetary and financial law and policy.  This is reflected 
in the debate during the crisis over whether emerging economies have 
“decoupled” from developed economies—i.e., that the plight of 
emerging economies is no longer tightly linked to what may happen 
in the economies of developed economies.  Moreover, the crisis gave 
emerging economies a platform to build upon the “governance and 
accountability” movement that resulted in proposed IMF voice-
related reforms in April 2008.  As the crisis worsened in the fall of 
2008, the leaders of the G-20 embarked upon a series of summits that 
resulted in promising voice reforms.  Specifically, the IMF announced 
that it would rely on ex-ante conditionality where appropriate, which 
is reflected in a new lending instrument called the Flexible Credit 
Line.  It also announced that it is discontinuing the use of structural 
performance criteria in all Fund arrangements, a decision that may 
give countries borrowing from the Fund more “ownership” over 
reform programs.  At the London Summit, the G-20 leaders agreed, 
among other things, to triple the resources available to the IMF to 
$750 billion, and to support a new special drawing rights (SDR) 
allocation of $250 billion.  They also agreed to expand the 
membership of the FSF (later renamed the Financial Stability Board) 
to include emerging economies, giving them an opportunity to play an 
important role in strengthening the global financial system.  At the 
Pittsburgh Summit, the leaders agreed that the G-20, which includes 
emerging economies, will be the “premier forum” for international 
economic cooperation.  Moreover, they pledged to modernize the 
IMF’s governance by, among other things, implementing a shift in 
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quota share to emerging and developing countries of at least five 
percent, addressing changes to the composition of the Executive 
Board, and committing to a merit-based process for selecting the head 
of the IMF and World Bank.  The Seoul Summit resulted in further 
advances in IMF governance reform via commitments to increase the 
quota shift to over six percent, a doubling of quotas, lowering the 
advanced European representation on the IMF Executive Board by 
two seats, and moving to an all-elected Board.4 
Part V concludes this Article, noting that while the global financial 
crisis provides emerging economies (and to a lesser extent developing 
economies) an important opportunity to develop a voice in global 
economic and financial matters, change will remain incremental and 
many questions remain relating to how emerging economies will take 
advantage of this opportunity. 
I 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ VOICE AT BRETTON WOODS 
The primary purpose of the Bretton Woods Conference in July 
1944 was not, of course, to improve the plight of developing 
countries.  Instead, it was to fashion institutions that would supervise 
a “transition from a war-time economy to a peace-time economy in 
the United Nations.”5  Invoking universalist themes embedded in the 
narrative of liberalism, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. 
captured the essence of the task when he spoke at the inaugural 
plenary session of the conference: 
 We are to concern ourselves here with essential steps in the 
creation of a dynamic world economy in which the people of every 
nation will be able to realize their potentialities in peace; will be 
able, through their industry, their inventiveness, their thrift, to raise 
their own standards of living and enjoy, increasingly, the fruits of 
material progress on an earth infinitely blessed with natural riches.  
This is the indispensable cornerstone of freedom and security.  All 
 
4 The G-20 held a summit in Toronto in June 2010, but, other than endorsing the World 
Bank shareholders’ agreement to increase the voting power of developing and 
transitioning countries by 4.59% since 2008, the summit leaders made no major decisions 
regarding the issues addressed in this article—it was seen as a stepping stone to the Seoul 
summit in November 2010. 
5 Victor L. Urquidi, Reconstruction vs. Development: The IMF and the World Bank, in 
THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 
30, 38 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM] 
(quoting Dr. White’s April 1942 proposal). 
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else must be built upon this.  For freedom of opportunity is the 
foundation for all other freedoms.6 
Accordingly, “an International Monetary Fund and possibly a Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development”7 would be created in order to 
advance liberalism’s twin goals of postwar peace and prosperity.  The 
IMF would promote international monetary cooperation and stability 
by enforcing a rule-based system of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates (the “par value system”), promoting currency convertibility, and 
providing members with temporary (short-term) resources to cope 
with balance-of-payments adjustment.8  In addition to coordinating 
private investment, the World Bank would provide (long-term) loans, 
initially for use in postwar reconstruction of war-torn Europe.9 
The main players at the conference were the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  The U.S. delegation faced isolationist sentiments in 
the U.S. Congress.  In the United Kingdom, many feared the proposed 
system would jeopardize U.K. ties with the Commonwealth as well as 
import future U.S. deflation (1930s-style).  Thus, both the U.K. and 
U.S. delegations concentrated on creating an international monetary 
system that would be acceptable in their respective domestic political 
arenas.10  The deliberations focused almost exclusively on 
complicated matters that were vital to such a system—e.g., rules 
relating to an international currency and multilateral clearing 
mechanism, drawing rights, par values, a transition period during 
which restrictions could be maintained on current account 
transactions, and the governance of the IMF.11 
 
6 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 80 (1948) [hereinafter 1 PROCEEDINGS] 
(remarks of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., U.S. Treasury Secretary). 
7 Margaret Garritsen de Vries, The Bretton Woods Conference and the Birth of the 
International Monetary Fund, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 9 
(quoting U.S. Secretary of State). 
8 Edward M. Bernstein, The Making and Remaking of the Bretton Woods Institutions, in 
THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 92–93. 
9 Urquidi, supra note 5, at 38.  According to Richard Gardner, “[I]n the early planning 
for the postwar economy, the Bank came almost as an afterthought.  Virtually all the 
attention of the British and U.S. Governments was focused on the International Monetary 
Fund.”  Richard N. Gardner, Establishing a Vision for Promoting Economic Development, 
in FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS: THE FUTURE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD 
BANK 63, 65 (James M. Boughton & K. Sarwar Lateef eds., 1995).  See also Garritsen de 
Vries, supra note 7, at 15 (“Since work for the Bank was much less advanced beforehand 
than work on the Fund, the Fund’s articles were used as a model for those of the Bank . . . . 
So, in many respects, the Bank became the mirror image of the Fund.”). 
10 Gardner, supra note 9, at 64–66. 
11 See Raymond F. Mikesell, Some Issues in the Bretton Woods Debates, in THE 
BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 19–29; see also Bernstein, supra note  
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Not surprisingly, then, the Conference treated development issues 
(e.g., structural impediments facing developing countries) 
“peripherally,” at best.12  The slight treatment of development and 
developing countries was not due to inattentive participants from 
developing countries—a good number of them attended the 
Conference.13  The Indian delegation, for instance, led a campaign to 
include references to developing countries throughout the IMF’s 
charter.14  Its efforts culminated in an unsuccessful attempt to add a 
phrase to the IMF’s purposes that would have required the IMF “to 
assist in the fuller utili[z]ation of the resources of economically 
under-developed countries.”15  The compromise limited development 
to an indirect purpose, making it a consequence of the IMF’s direct 
 
8, at 89–92; Sir Alexander Cairncross, A British Perspective on Bretton Woods, in THE 
BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 70–81; HAROLD JAMES, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRETTON WOODS 27–57 (1996); see 
generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 101–14 (1982); ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, 
BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM (1978); RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 4–23 (1985); RICHARD N. GARDNER, 
STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 11–13 (1969); 4 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 13–18 (2d ed. 1984); GEORG SCHILD, BRETTON 
WOODS AND DUMBARTON OAKS: AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POSTWAR 
PLANNING IN THE SUMMER OF 1944 (1995). 
12 JAMES, supra note 11, at 120; see also Roberto Campos, Fifty Years of Bretton 
Woods, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 99 (“In regard to the 
World Bank, the fear of the underdeveloped countries was that its resources would be 
almost completely absorbed by the task of reconstruction, with precious little left for 
development . . . .”); see also Gardner, supra note 9, at 65 (“There was simply no 
conception of the vast needs of the developing countries and of the role the Bank should 
play in meeting them.”); Urquidi, supra note 5, at 43 (“the concept of development was 
practically absent”); id. at 47 (White and Keynes “did not seem to have a clear idea of the 
usually quite different structural problems of the less developed countries.”).  The drafters 
of the World Bank’s charter included “the encouragement of the development of 
productive facilities and resources in less developed countries as a purpose of the Bank.”  
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 
7, 1945, art. I(i), 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as amended, 16 U.S.T. 1942, (Dec. 17, 
1965) [hereinafter IBRD Articles]. 
13 Developing countries constituted a numerical majority at the Conference.  The bulk 
of such countries were Latin American.  See Garritsen de Vries, supra note 7, at 13–14; 
see also J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1945–1965:  
TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION 93–108 (1969). 
14 Joseph Gold, “. . . To Contribute Thereby To...Development . . .”: Aspects of the 
Relations of the International Monetary Fund with its Developing Members, 10 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 267, 271 (1971). 
15 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 23; see Indian delegation recording additional 
attempts, id. at 131, 184, 335–36, 424–26, 1171–73, see DEP’T OF STATE, 2 PROCEEDINGS 
AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 
1171–73, 1180–81 (1948) [hereinafter 2 PROCEEDINGS]. 
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purpose to “facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of 
international trade . . . .”16 
The Mexican delegation experienced a similar result when it urged 
the drafters of the Bank’s charter to consider “development” as well 
as “reconstruction.”17  The Mexicans offered an amendment to the 
proposed language for Article III, Section 1 that would have required 
the Bank not only to “give equal consideration to projects for 
development and to projects for reconstruction” but also to “always” 
make “its resources and facilities . . . available to the same extent for 
either kind of project.”18  The drafters ultimately adopted a softened 
version of the amendment, requiring the Bank to give “equitable 
consideration to projects for development and projects for 
reconstruction alike.”19 
Brazil also attempted to stress developing country concerns at the 
conference.  Because erratic commodity prices caused havoc with 
developing countries’ balance-of-payments, the Brazilian delegation 
pressed for a conference “to promote stability of prices of raw 
materials and agricultural products and to formulate recommendations 
for attainment of a more balanced growth of international trade.”20  
The Brazilian’s resolution, though adopted,21 took a back seat to the 
central issues identified above.22 
The treatment of development issues at the Bretton Woods 
Conference suggests that success was achieved in part by 
marginalizing the interests of developing countries.23  By doing so, 
the IMF and World Bank treaties clearly enshrined a “universal” 
 
16 Article I(ii) reads: 
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are: 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment 
and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members 
as primary objectives of economic policy. 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I(ii).  The 
phrase “and to contribute thereby” converts the remaining portion of the clause into 
indirect consequences of growth in trade.  Gold, supra note 14, at 275–76. 
17 Urquidi, supra note 5, at 40. 
18 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 373–74. 
19 IBRD Articles, supra note 12, art. III, § 1(a). 
20 Campos, supra note 12, at 100. 
21 See 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 941 (Resolution VII). 
22 Campos, supra note 12, at 100. 
23 Marginalization could be described another way: the refusal to distinguish formally 
between member countries—i.e., developing versus developed countries.  See Gold, supra 
note 14, at 277–82 (discussing “[f]ormal [e]quality” embodied in the IMF’s charter). 
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proposition that motivated the conference in the first place—that an 
open international economy was the best prescription for global 
prosperity, which, in turn, would help maintain international peace.24  
Economic growth was at the heart of postwar liberalism.  The Bretton 
Woods Institutions (BWIs), along with the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),25 were charged with promoting growth via 
international economic law governing trade and investment.26 
II 
THE VOICE OF THE NIEO 
Decolonization after World War II raised expectations among 
developing countries that industrialized countries would recognize the 
importance of, and financially support, development in the South.27  
Assistance from the North was not forthcoming, however.28  
Increasingly frustrated, developing countries claimed the prevailing 
global order perpetuated economic inequality among nations.29  They 
therefore called for a NIEO, a highly controversial effort to effectuate 
the principle of sovereign equality of States by reforming 
 
24 The following is illustrative: 
[T]he proposal for . . . the Fund . . . was based on the premise that international 
financial cooperation and the establishment of conditions conducive to international 
trade are imperative to the economic welfare of the peoples of the world and to 
world peace . . . . Proposals for the establishment of the Bank were based on the 
premise that postwar reconstruction and development are essential to the general 
economic interest [and] that a program for reconstruction and development would 
aid political stability and foster peace among all nations. 
Introduction to 1 Proceedings, supra note 6, at viii. 
25 See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION (1970); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989). 
26 Dam, supra note 11, at 3 (“International rules today arise largely out of international 
organizations.”). 
27 See ERVIN LASZLO ET AL., THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER xv, xviii (1978) [hereinafter OBJECTIVES OF NIEO] (“Desires for rapid 
social and economic growth were soon translated by the governments into ambitious plans 
and programmes of national development.  Most of the plans envisaged a quick repetition 
of the industrial growth processes of the developed world. . . . [S]ome of the original 
strategies underwent modification, but hardly ever surrendered the goal of rapid economic 
growth.”). 
28 Id. at xix. 
29 Robert S. Jordan, Why a NIEO? The View from the Third World, in THE EMERGING 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 59, 63 (Harold K. Jacobson & Dusan Sidjanski eds., 
1982). 
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international economic law and policy.30  In May 1974, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted two resolutions that would form the basis 
of the NIEO: the “Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order,”31 and the “Programme of Action on 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.”32  In 
December of the same year, the General Assembly adopted a re-
articulation of the Declaration and Programme in a resolution titled, 
“Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.”33  It passed by a 
vote of 120 for, 10 abstentions, and 6 against—Belgium, Denmark, 
the German Federal Republic, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.34 
The NIEO called for negotiations with industrialized countries to 
modify the philosophical, juridical, and institutional structures of the 
prevailing international economic order.35  Among other things, the 
Charter, which elaborated on the Declaration and Programme of 
Action,36 stated that: 
All States are juridically the equal and . . . have the right to 
participate fully and effectively in international decision-making 
process[es] in the solution of world economic, financial and 
monetary problems, inter alia, through the appropriate international 
organizations in accordance with their existing and evolving rules.37 
 Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its 
economic . . . political, social and cultural systems in accordance 
with the will of its people;38 [e]very State has . . . full permanent 
 
30 It was controversial in part because developing countries demanded preferential, non-
reciprocal treatment.  See RUMU SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW 217 
(2009). 
31 See generally G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/5-6/3201 (May 1, 1974) 
(adopting the “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order”). 
32 See generally G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/5-6/3202 (May 1, 1974) 
(adopting the “Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order”). 
33 See G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974) [hereinafter 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States] (adopting the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States after “[b]earing in mind the spirit and terms of . . . the 
Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order”). 
34 Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the 
Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 437, 437–39 (1981). 
35 See TYRONE FERGUSON, THE THIRD WORLD AND DECISION MAKING IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7–46 (1988). 
36 See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 33. 
37 Id. at 52–53. 
38 Id. at 52. 
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sovereignty . . . over all its wealth, natural resources and economic 
activities.39 
 It is the right and duty of all States, individually and collectively, 
to eliminate colonialism . . . neo-colonialism and all forms of . . . 
domination, and the economic and social consequences thereof[.]40 
Monetary and financial issues were important items on the agenda.  
Developing countries demanded effective participation in the 
decision-making of international financial organizations and greater 
access to financial resources from the North to meet their 
development needs.41  With respect to quotas, the NIEO stressed the 
need “[t]o take fully into account the requirements of developing 
countries for, and their ability to contribute to, balance-of-payments 
finance [and] to increase the over-all participation of developing 
countries in the decision-making process of the Fund.”42  The Manila 
Declaration by the Group of 77 stated that “the system of voting in 
the IMF and the World Bank should be reformed so as to accord 
developing countries greater representation and weight in decision-
making in these institutions.”43  The Group of 77 also argued that “the 
conditionality attached to drawings from the IMF by developing 
countries should take fully into account the structural problems of 
economies of the developing countries.”44  The NIEO Programme of 
Action called for increased liquidity in the international monetary 
system through an additional allocation of SDRs and it also stipulated 
that there should be an “[e]arly establishment of a link between 
special drawing rights and additional development financing in the 
interest of developing countries.”45 Noting the IMF’s “zeal for 
universalism,” Albert Fishlow called upon the IMF to establish an 
international bankruptcy court for debtor developing countries.46  He 
also argued that a NIEO should require the IMF to adopt “sets of 
[conditionality] rules appropriate to different classes of countries—
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 53. 
41 See id. at 52. 
42 G.A. Res. 3347 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 74, 75 U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(1974). 
43 MANILA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION: REPORT ON MINISTRIAL 
MEETING OF THE GROUP OF 77, Doc. 77/MM(III)/4a at 28 (1976). 
44 OBJECTIVES OF NIEO, supra note 27, at 228. 
45 G.A. Res. 3202, supra note 32, at § II, (f) (given the depreciating dollar, the reserve 
asset, the Group of 77 argued that SDRs should become the principal reserve asset); see 
also OBJECTIVES OF NIEO, supra note 27, at 228. 
46 Albert Fishlow, International Monetary and Financial Issues from a National 
Perspective: a Comment, in LATIN AMERICA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER 41, 47 (Ricardo Ffrench-Davis & Ernesto Tironi eds., 1982). 
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depending, among other factors, on their financial structure, the 
composition of trade and its price responsiveness, and the flexibility 
of internal production and factor prices.”47 
There is no doubt that developing countries acquired a loud, even 
strident, voice through the NIEO agenda.  However, the rich countries 
would not listen.  This is not surprising in light of the dispute over the 
legal significance of the NIEO.  In response to claims that the NIEO 
reflected customary international law,48 critics argued the nonbinding 
resolutions were merely moral or political statements, at best 
constituting “soft law.”49  The deep divisions between the North and 
South left much of the NIEO’s business unfinished.  It met a quiet 
death (or lapsed into a coma) after the late 1970s.50 
III 
THE RISE OF IMF STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY 
In the wake of the NIEO’s death came the rise of neoliberalism in 
the 1980s, a global phenomenon that promoted a development 
paradigm based on free markets and a greatly reduced role for the 
State.  In most cases, developing countries did not initiate the 
neoliberal transformation of their economies—i.e., unlike the NIEO, 
the voice of the South did not articulate the neoliberal agenda.  
Instead, in a mockery of the NIEO principles, the IMF imposed 
neoliberal reform via conditionality, particularly structural 
conditionality.51 
 
47 Id. at 47. 
48 See Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing 
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 460-61 (2000) (stating 
that “the NIEO documents, were denied the status of customary law . . . . and thus the 
Charter was declared to be a ‘political rather than a legal declaration . . . .’”) (citations 
omitted). 
49 See id. 
50 See Michael P. Ryan et al., International Governmental Organization Knowledge 
Management For Multilateral Trade Lawmaking, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1347, 1372 
(2000) (“The GATT’s attempts to solve the economic problems of developing countries in 
the 1960s and 1970s [through the NIEO] were largely feeble.”). 
51 Conditionality is based on various provisions of the IMF’s Charter.  See International 
Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, art. I (v) (“To give confidence to members by 
making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate 
safeguards); IMF, Articles of Agreement, art. V § 3(a) (“The Fund shall adopt policies on 
the use of its general resources . . . that will establish adequate safeguards for the 
temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.”); IMF, Articles of Agreement, art. V § 
3(c) (“The Fund shall examine a request for purchase to determine whether the proposed 
purchase would be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”). 
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The collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in 
the early 1970s set the stage for the IMF’s role in implementing 
market-based reforms globally.  Until President Nixon closed the 
“gold window,” in 1971,52 the IMF’s principal function was to ensure 
global financial stability by overseeing fixed exchange rates that were 
tied to the U.S. dollar (with the dollar tied to gold at thirty-five dollars 
an ounce).53  After the system’s collapse, the IMF’s relevance came 
into question.  With the adoption of the Second Amendment to the 
Articles of Agreement in 1978, IMF members were free to choose 
their own exchange arrangements, and the IMF sought to maintain its 
relevance by assuming surveillance powers.54 
It was not long thereafter that the IMF found its new mission: 
neoliberal transformation of developing countries involved in the debt 
crisis of the 1980s.55  The IMF’s transformational tool was 
conditionality, which refers to the policies and adjustments borrowing 
 
52 Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 443, 447 (1983).  Under the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. dollar 
functioned as the reserve currency and member countries were entitled to exchange dollars 
for U.S. gold.  See id. 
53 See id.; see also Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing 
World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 1249, 1261 (2000) (“The first version of the agreement establishing the 
IMF required all members to commit to a ‘par value’ system to establish values for their 
currencies in terms of gold or the U.S. dollar, and maintain their currencies within fairly 
narrow margins of those values.”). 
54 Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 15 I.L.M. 546 (adopted April 30, 1976) (entered into force April 1, 
1978).  Surveillance requires, inter alia, each member to notify the IMF of any change in 
their exchange arrangements.  Robert M. Barnett, Exchange Rate Arrangements in the 
International Monetary Fund: The Fund as Lawgiver, Adviser, and Enforcer, 7 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 77, 87 (1993).  The IMF does not, however, have the power to veto 
these decisions.  Id.  Under Article IV of the Fund’s charter, “each member undertakes to 
collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and 
to promote a stable system of exchange rates.”  International Monetary Fund, Articles of 
Agreement, Art. IV § 1; see Factsheet: IMF Surveillance—The 2007 Decision on Bilateral 
Surveillance, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np 
/exr/facts/surv.htm. 
55 See Enrique R. Carrasco, The 1980s: The Debt Crisis & the Lost Decade, in E-BOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT (E. Carrasco ed., 2010), 
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part1-V.shtml; Enrique R. Carrasco, 
Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards a Communal Model 
of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 221, 244–61 (1994) 
[hereinafter Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups]; Henk Overbeek, Neoliberalism and 
the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility, 581 ANNALS 74, 80 (2002); Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 502 (1998). 
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member countries must follow in exchange for Fund loans.56  
Traditionally, Fund conditionality involved short-term stabilization 
measures that addressed aggregate demand via budgetary and 
monetary adjustments.57  However, in the 1980s the Fund’s 
conditionality increasingly addressed longer-term structural reforms.58  
Structural conditionality evolved into a range of measures that 
included, inter alia, reforms of the financial sector and capital 
markets, privatization of public enterprises, trade liberalization, 
restructuring of the labor market and civil service, pension reform, as 
well as corporate governance reform.59  The structural approach to 
conditionality was applied with special vigor in “transitioning 
economies”—i.e., centrally planned economies transitioning to free 
markets, such as the former Soviet Union and the communist bloc 
countries of Europe.60  The Fund’s market-based structural reform 
mission emphasizing privatization and deregulation became so 
pervasive that it was labelled the “Washington Consensus.”61 
Structural conditionality reached a crescendo in the Asian financial 
crisis of the late 1990s.  For instance, at the height of the crisis, IMF 
arrangements with Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia included a 
staggering 94, 73, and 140 structural conditions, respectively.62  The 
structural conditions for Indonesia included removing VAT 
 
56 See generally ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY (1996). 
57 See Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups, supra note 55 (Part II discusses IMF 
stabilization measures). 
58 The Fund employed structural conditionality prior to the 1980s.  In 1974, it 
established the Extended Fund Facility for countries with protracted balance-of-payments 
problems.  It established similar facilities in the 1980s: the Structural Adjustment Facility 
(1986), and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (1987).  For a discussion 
regarding possible reasons for the evolution and expansion of structural conditionality, see 
Ariel Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 16–17 (G-24 Discussion Paper Series, 
Paper No. 22, August 2003); MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, IMF STRUCTURAL PROGRAMS 64–68 
(Oct., 2000), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/goldstein1000.pdf.  It is 
important to note that the World Bank also engaged in structural adjustment lending.  See 
Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups, supra note 55, at 247–50. 
59 See generally INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY 
IN IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS (2007) [hereinafter IEO CONDITIONALITY REP.]; 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, at 4. 
60 See generally Robert P. Delonis, International Finance Standards and Codes: 
Mandatory Regulation Without Representation, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 563, 574–75 
(2004) (stating that in 1991, the G-7 countries decided that “the IMF should take the lead 
in assisting the transition of the former Soviet bloc states, particularly Russia, from 
socialist to market economies”). 
61 See generally John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in 
LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7 (John Williamson, ed., 
1990). 
62 Buira, supra note 58, at 9. 
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exemption arrangements, introducing a single taxpayer registration 
number, providing autonomy to state banks to adjust interest rates on 
credit and deposit liabilities, requiring all banks to prepare audited 
financial statements, lifting restrictions on branching by foreign 
banks, closing non-viable banks and transferring weak banks to a 
newly formed Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency, drafting 
legislation to enable privatization of state banks, abolishing local 
content requirements on dairy products, abolishing export taxes on 
leather, cork, ores and waste aluminum products, removing 
restrictions on foreign investment in palm oil plantations, and taking 
action to allow “free competition in: (i) importation of wheat, wheat 
flour, soybeans and garlic; (ii) sale or distribution of flour; and (iii) 
importation and marketing of sugar.”63 
Of course, the IMF’s use of structural conditionality was 
controversial.64  NGOs argued that structural conditionality prevented 
borrowing countries from developing a sense of ownership of the 
adjustment programs65—which ultimately resulted in significant 
program failure rates.66  Moreover, borrowing countries gamed 
conditionality by complying with the conditions during the program 
and thereafter dropping or reversing the reform policies.67  Critics also 
claimed that structural conditionality reflected ideology without 
addressing the actual conditions in the borrowing countries.68  
 
63 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, at tbl.8. 
64 See generally Thomas D. Willet, Understanding the IMF Debate, 5 INDEP. REV. 593 
(2001). 
65 See EURODAD, WORLD BANK AND IMF CONDITIONALITY: A DEVELOPMENT 
INJUSTICE, EURODAD REPORT 3 (June 2006), http://www.eurodad.org/uploaded 
Files/Whats_New/Reports/Eurodad_World_Bank_and_IMF_Conditionality_Report.pdf 
(stating that conditions often “contravene developing countries’ wishes, an acknowledged 
prerequisite for successful development”); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, at 6 
(“[S]tructural remedies . . . undermines local ‘ownership’ of Fund programs.”); ANGELA 
WOOD & MATTHEW LOCKWOOD, THE “PERESTROIKA OF AID”? NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
CONDITIONALITY 1 (Mar. 1999), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/governance 
/poa2.pdf. 
66 See Buira, supra note 58, at 9 (“[T]he high and increasing proportion of program 
failures gave rise to questions as to the point of having ever more comprehensive and 
ambitious programs that were not complied with.”); see also Michael Mussa & Miguel 
Savastano, The IMF Economic Approach to Stabilization, 1999 NBER MACROECONOMICS 
ANNUAL 79, 105; see IEO CONDITIONALITY REP., supra note 59, at 8. 
67 WOOD & LOCKWOOD, supra note 65, at 1; see David Dollar & Jakob Svensson, 
What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?, 110 ECON. 
J. 894 (2000). 
68 ACTION AID, MONEY TALKS: HOW AID CONDITIONS CONTINUE TO DRIVE UTILITY 
PRIVATIZATION IN POOR COUNTRIES (2004), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk 
/_content/documents/money_talks.pdf; see EURODAD, supra note 65, at 3. 
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Furthermore, the agreed adjustment programs suffered from a 
democratic deficit in that key sectors of society were not consulted or 
included in program negotiations.69 
The proliferation of structural performance criteria led to a 
streamlining initiative that commenced in 2000 and led to revised 
conditionality guidelines in 2002.70  Those guidelines sought to rein in 
structural conditionality by requiring “parsimony” when setting 
conditions and by requiring that such conditions be “critical” to the 
achievement of the program’s goals.71  The revisions, however, had 
little effect on the IMF’s use of structural conditionality. 
This led to an evaluation of IMF conditionality by the Independent 
Evaluation Office (IEO) in 2007.  The report found that despite the 
Streamlining Initiative, IMF loans continued to be plagued with 
structural conditions—an average of seventeen per program year—
that were “very detailed, not obviously critical, and often felt to be 
intrusive and to undermine domestic ownership of programs.”72 
Among other things, the IEO recommended a notional cap on the 
number of structural conditions per program-year, which would force 
the Fund to justify the “criticality” of the conditions.73 
In sum, after the demise of the NIEO, advanced economies that 
controlled the IMF used structural conditionality to fundamentally 
restructure developing and transitioning economies.  Although certain 
constituencies in some borrowing member countries favored 
structural conditionality,74 the IEO report confirmed that the 
borrowers had little ownership in the adjustment programs.  Put 
another way, developing and transitioning countries had little voice 
within the IMF, and, therefore, little voice with respect to the 
economic restructuring of their economies.75 
 
69 See OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, FROM “DONORSHIP TO OWNERSHIP?” MOVING 
TOWARDS PRSP ROUND TWO, OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 51 at 1 (2004). 
70 See generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org 
/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf; see also MARTIN A. WEISS, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NEW IMF CONDITIONALITY GUIDELINES 3 (Nov. 19, 2002), 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/ipe2007/files/crs_conditionality_guidelines.pdf. 
71 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 70, at 8–9. 
72 IEO CONDITIONALITY REP., supra note 59, at vii. 
73 Id. at 20. 
74 See Buira, supra note 58, at 31 (noting that in some developing countries U.S.-
educated technocrats favored market-based reforms). 
75 Id. at 4–5. 
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IV 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Just one year after the IEO issued its report on structural 
conditionality, the world experienced the worst financial and 
economic crisis since the Great Depression.  Throughout history, calls 
for reform have followed in the wake of major financial or economic 
crises.  The extent and nature of reforms depend, of course, on the 
players that control the discourse over establishing the new order.  In 
1944, in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, the controlling players 
were the United States and the United Kingdom.  Developing 
countries were on the sidelines and “emerging economies” did not 
exist.  The global financial crisis of 2008 occurred in a vastly 
different world, a world where the economic power of (white) 
Americans and Europeans is being challenged by (non-white) non-
Western countries such as China and India.76  Consequently, as this 
Part will show, in the Summits that occurred during the crisis, new 
players demanded to be included in the discourse regarding the post-
crisis financial and economic order.  First, I briefly address the impact 
of the crisis on emerging economies. 
A.  Emerging Economies and the Crisis 
The global financial crisis was triggered by subprime loans in the 
United States and, due in part to lax or no regulation over certain 
financial instruments and institutions, spread throughout the world via 
securitization.77  At the outset of the crisis, most observers believed 
that emerging economies would not be significantly affected by the 
crisis, which appeared to be concentrated in the United States and 
Europe.  This is because most emerging economies did not hold toxic 
assets.  Moreover, after the economic/financial crises in the 1980s and 
1990s, many emerging economies engaged in significant reform of 
their financial sectors, including significant increases in foreign 
 
76 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
77 See Alexandra Basak Russel, What Gave Rise to the Global Financial Crisis?, in E-
BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT (E. Carrasco ed., 2010), 
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part5-I.shtml; see also Stijn Claessens et 
al., Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis (IMF Working 
Paper No. 10/44, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1044.pdf; Adam 
J. Levitin et al., Securitization: Cause or Remedy of the Financial Crisis? (Georgetown 
Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 1462895, Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research 
Paper No. 09-31, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1462895. 
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exchange reserves, which would make them less vulnerable to 
external shocks.  Thus, they were becoming “decoupled” from 
developed countries’ economies and not dependent on them for 
economic growth and stability.78  Indeed, in the midst of the financial 
crisis in the summer of 2008, it appeared that growth in emerging 
economies, amounting to half of all global economic growth in a 
given year, could help avert a global meltdown. 
Nevertheless, emerging economies were not immune from the 
crisis.  Despite their progress, they still depend greatly on foreign 
capital and investment, which is problematic when, during a crisis, 
foreign investors withdraw their money to perceived safer 
investments.  Moreover, much of the double-digit growth seen 
throughout the developing world has depended on the availability of 
foreign credit, a stable currency, and sustainable global demand for 
exports, all of which were put in jeopardy because of the crisis.  Thus, 
emerging economies experienced decreased capital and investment 
flows, currency depreciation, stock market crashes, and drops in 
exports and commodity prices.79 
Still, while emerging and developing countries were not spared 
from the global financial crisis, for the most part their economies 
recovered more quickly in 2009 than the economies of the United 
States and Europe.80  Therefore, the concept of decoupling cannot be 
summarily dismissed, and the possibility of it has at least one very 
significant impact: it has given emerging economies a voice that, 
unlike the NIEO of the 1970s, is capturing the attention of the 
developed world. 
 
78 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING, MICROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 
44 (2008); M. Ayhan Kose & Eswar Prasad, The Financial Crisis and Emerging Markets, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0924 
_emerging_markets_prasad.aspx; see M. Ayhan Kose, Christopher Otrok & Eswar Prasad, 
Global Business Cycles: Convergence or Decoupling? 25 (IMF Working Paper No. 
08/143, 2008) (concluding that there is evidence of business cycle divergence or 
decoupling between industrial economies and emerging market economies).  But see 
Michael Dooley & Michael Hutchison, Transmission of the U.S. Subprime Crisis to 
Emerging Markets: Evidence on the Decoupling-Recoupling Hypothesis, 28 J. INT’L 
MONEY AND FIN. 1331 (2009) (arguing that policy measures adopted by emerging 
economies to insulate them from the global financial crisis proved inadequate). 
79 Enrique R. Carrasco, Crisis and Opportunity: Emerging Economies and the 
Financial Stability Board 199–207, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, GLOBALIZATION 
& DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Julio Faundez & Celine Tan, eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript 
on file). 
80 Id. at 207–08; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC AND 
FINANCIAL SURVEYS: REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, ix (April 2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/apd/eng/areo0410.pdf. 
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B.  The Drumbeat for Governance and Accountability Reform 
Even prior to the global financial crisis and the decoupling debate, 
there was a post-NIEO “governance and accountability reform” 
movement to give developing and emerging economies greater voice 
in international monetary affairs.  The movement’s roots can be 
traced to 1994, when the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund marked the fiftieth year of their existence.  The anniversary 
prompted hundreds of religious, labor, human rights, and 
environmental organizations across the globe to declare that “Fifty 
Years Is Enough.”81  Critics claimed the two institutions contributed 
to human rights abuses, social injustice, and environmental 
degradation in developing countries.82 
Only a few years following the controversial anniversary, the IMF 
and the World Bank had to cope with the outbreak of the Asian 
financial crisis.  The Fund’s handling of the crisis gave critics yet 
another opportunity to denounce it.  Among other things,83 critics 
claimed the Fund was an opaque institution that suffered from a 
“democratic deficit”—i.e., that member countries most affected by 
the Fund’s programs had little voice in an institution controlled by a 
handful of industrialized countries.84  In particular, the Fund’s Board 
of Directors has been dominated by members of industrialized 
countries.85  Moreover, its quota-based weighted voting system has 
given the G-7 countries approximately forty-five percent of the voting 
power in the Fund.86  Industrialized-country domination of the Fund 
 
81 Enrique R. Carrasco et al., 50th Anniversary of the World Bank and IMF Prompts 
Criticisms, in E-BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 1 (Enrique. 
Carrasco ed., 2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part2-II.shtml. 
82 See id. 
83 For a stinging critique of the Fund’s adjustment policies in the Asian financial crisis, 
see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (W.W. Norton & Co., 
2003) (2002). 
84 John W. Head, The Asian Financial Crisis in Retrospect-Observations on Legal and 
Institutional Lessons Learned After a Dozen Years, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 31, 63 (2010); see 
REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK (Ariel Buira ed., 
2005); NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR 
BORROWERS (2006); Ngaire Woods, Making the IMF and the World Bank More 
Accountable, 77 INT’L AFF. 83 (2001); Daniel D. Bradlow, Rapidly Changing Functions 
and Slowly Evolving Structures: The Troubling Case of the IMF, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 152 (2000). 
85 Head, supra note 84, at 77. 
86 See Head, supra note 84 at 77.  The IMF assigns a quota to a member country based 
on the economic size of each country.  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF QUOTAS 
FACTSHEET 2 [hereinafter IMF QUOTAS], http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf 
/quotas.pdf.  Quotas, denominated in Special Drawings Rights (SDR), determine each  
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has also been reflected in the tradition that has allowed the Europeans 
to name the institution’s managing director (whereas the United 
States has traditionally named the president of the World Bank). 
The Fund responded to its critics with a number of limited 
measures.  Among other accountability-related measures,87 in July 
2001, it established the Independent Evaluation Office to perform 
“objective and independent” evaluations of issues relating to the 
Fund’s mandate.88  As to voice-related governance measures, in 2006 
the Fund made an ad hoc quota adjustment for China, Turkey, Korea, 
and Mexico.89  In April 2008, it proposed a series of voice-related 
reforms, which included, inter alia, adopting a revised quota 
 
member country’s voting power.  Id.  In addition to 250 “basic votes,” a member has more 
votes depending on its quota (one vote for each 100,000 SDR of quota).  Id. 
87 See Head, supra note 84, at 88–89 (describing broader authority given to the IMF’s 
International Monetary and Financial Committee to give member governments more direct 
involvement in the Fund’s policymaking, in efforts to make the Fund’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper process more participatory). 
88 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
ABOUT IEO, http://www.ieo-imf.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).  The IEO was 
established with a mission to enhance the effectiveness of IMF by 1) fostering the learning 
culture of the IMF, 2) enhancing the external credibility, 3) providing independent 
evaluation reports, and 4) promoting a better understanding the IMF’s work.  Id.  Every 
year, the IEO publishes about two evaluation reports.  See INDEPENDENT EVALUATION 
OFFICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, EVALUATION REPORT http://www.ieo 
-imf.org/pub /evalreports.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) (making available all prior 
evaluation reports).  As of Jan. 2011, it has produced 17 reports including a report 
regarding the governance of the IMF.  Id.  According to the IEO’s Terms of References, 
the IEO operates independent from the IMF’s management.  INDEPENDENT EVALUATION 
OFFICE OF THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, ABOUT IEO, http://www.ieo-imf.org/about/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011).  However, some question the independence of the IEO.  See, e.g., 
Head, supra note 84, at 88; Kate Weaver, The Political Paradox of IO Performance: The 
Curious Case of the International Monetary Fund (2009), http://mershoncenter 
.osu.edu/events/09-10%20events/Nov09/Weaver.Political.Paradox.of.IO.Performance.pdf. 
89 In September 2006, the IMF member countries adopted a series of plans to reform 
quotas and voices.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, Reform of IMF Quotas and Voice: 
Responding to Changes in the Global Economy, http://www.imf.org/External 
/NP/EXR/ib/2007/041307.pdf [hereinafter Reform of IMF Quotas and Voice].  As the first 
step of the reform plans, quotas for four “dynamic economies”—China, Turkey, Korea, 
and Mexico were increased by SDR 3.81 billion to SDR 216.75 billion.  Id. at 1–2.  Prior 
to the voice measures, about twenty-four developed member countries wielded sixty 
percent of the voting power.  Jane Ro & Michael Sarabia, Governance and Accountability 
at the International Monetary Fund, in ISSUES ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & 
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/issues/accountability/Governance_& 
_Accountability-IMF.pdf.  In 2002, the voting power of the EU was approximately thirty 
percent, whereas the Asian countries, including China, had a mere eighteen percent voting 
share.  Diwa C. Guinigundo, The IMF and Its Governance: Focus on Practising and 
Preaching, BANGKO SENTRAL REV. 52 available at http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads 
/publications/2003/BSR2003_05.pdf (Jan. 2003). 
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formula,90 a second round of ad hoc quota increases for “dynamic 
economies,”91 and a tripling of basic votes intended to increase the 
voice of low-income countries.92  As to the selection of the IMF’s 
Managing Director, a consensus has developed that the Fund should 
abandon the tradition of allowing the Europeans to choose the 
Managing Director behind closed doors and instead adopt a process of 
appointment that is “open, transparent, and merit-based.”93  The G-20 
 
90 The new formula is a weighted average of four variables—“GDP, openness, 
variability, and reserves—weights of 50 percent, 30 percent, 15 percent, and 5 percent, 
respectively.”  International Monetary Fund, Reform of Quota and Voice in International 
Monetary Fund—Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors 2 (Mar. 28, 
2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/032108.pdf [hereinafter 
Report of the Executive Board].  By using this formula, emerging economies are expected 
to have higher quota shares.  For the existing five quota formulas, see IMF QUOTAS, supra 
note 86, at 1. 
91 The Executive Board recommended a second round of ad hoc quota increases to 
enhance quotas for underrepresented countries under a revised quota formula.  Report of 
the Executive Board, supra note 90, at 1.  A second round of increases is expected to 
further increase the “voting share[s] of emerging market and developing countries as a 
whole.”  Id. at 4.  Ad hoc quota increases only change the relative quota shares among 
member countries.  IMF QUOTAS, supra note 86, at 2.  In contrast, a general quota 
increase raises actual quotas for all members.  Id.  See Head, supra note 84, at 94–95 
(listing quota share adjustments). 
92 A member country is entitled to have 250 “basic votes.”  Reform of IMF Quotas and 
Voice, supra note 89, at 5.  While the share of basic votes was eleven percent when the 
IMF was established, the current basic votes only represent two percent.  Id.  Increasing 
the number of basic votes will enhance the voting power of member countries whose 
voting power is “below the average voting power for Fund membership as a whole, and 
thereby to allow the smallest members to have an increased measure of influence in the 
Fund’s decision-making process.”  Id.  The reforms also call for an additional Alternate 
Executive Director for Executive Directors who represent a large number of members, a 
measure intended to help the two African constituencies on the Executive Board.  Id.; 
Head, supra note 84, at 96.  As of this writing, the 2008 proposed reforms, which require 
an amendment of the Fund’s Charter, have not taken effect.  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND, ACCEPTANCES OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE ARTICLES OF 
AGREEMENT (July 1, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/consents.htm#a1.  
Amending the Articles of Agreement requires acceptance by 112 member countries 
(eighty-five percent of the total voting power).  Id.  As of July 1, 2010, eighty-four 
countries have approved the proposed amendment.  Id.  For critical views of the proposed 
reforms, see Ralph C. Bryant, Reform of IMF Quota Shares and Voting Shares: A Missed 
Opportunity (April 8, 2008) available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc 
/papers/2008/0409_imf_bryant/0409_imf_bryant.pdf; Charles L. Vehorn & Nozar 
Hashemzadeh, The International Monetary Fund: Part of the Problem or Part of the 
Solution? 3 J. GLOBAL BUS. ISSUES 137, 141–42 (2009). 
93 Committee on IMF Governance Reform, Final Report 4 (Mar. 24, 2009); see 
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF: AN EVALUATION 22 (2008), available at http://www.ieo.imf 
.org/eval/complete/eval_05212008.html (“The selection process for the Managing Director 
should be reformed . . . . Candidates’ qualifications and likely effectiveness should be the 
main criteria used in the selection, and the competition should be open to candidates of all  
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endorsed this proposition in the summits held during the global 
financial crisis,94 which I turn to next. 
C.  The Summits 
A key voice that arose during the global financial crisis was the G-
20,95 a forum created in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 
which finance ministers and central bank governors from systemically 
important industrialized and developing countries discuss issues 
relating to the global economy.96  In November 2008, April 2009, 
September 2009, and November 2010, the G-20 held summits in 
Washington, D.C., London, Pittsburgh, and Seoul respectively, to 
address the global crisis.97  The summits resulted in a number of 
decisions that reflected the increased voice of emerging and 
developing countries within the IMF and in global financial 
governance generally. 
1.  The November Summit 
On November 15, 2008, leaders of the G-20 met in Washington, 
D.C., to address what had become the worst global financial and 
economic crisis since the Great Depression.98  There was some initial 
anticipation that the meeting, dubbed by some as “Bretton Woods 
 
nationalities.”); The G-20 London Communiqué, The Global Plan for Recovery and 
Reform ¶ 20 (Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter G-20 London Communiqué], available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf; The G-20 Pittsburgh 
Communiqué, Leaders’ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, 11 (Sept. 24–25, 2009) 
[hereinafter G-20 Pittsburgh Communiqué], available at http://www.g20.org/Documents 
/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf. 
94 G-20 London Communiqué, supra note 93, at ¶ 20; G-20 Pittsburgh Communiqué, 
supra note 93, at 11. 
95 G-20 is an informal forum made up of finance ministers and central bank governors 
created in the wake of the Asian financial crisis to address the lack of emerging and 
developing economy membership in the Group of Seven leading economies (G-7).  G-
20.org, About G-20: What is the G-20? [hereinafter What Is the G-20?], 
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
96 The G-20 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Republic of Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The European 
Union is the twentieth member.  Id. 
97 The G-20 held a summit in Toronto in June 2010, but, other than endorsing the 
World Bank shareholders’ agreement to increase the voting power of developing and 
transitioning countries by 4.59% since 2008, the summit leaders made no major decisions 
regarding the issues addressed in this article—it was seen as a stepping stone to the Seoul 
summit in November 2010. 
98 See G-20, Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, ¶ 1 
(Nov. 15, 2008) [hereinafter G-20, Declaration], http://www.g20.org/documents/g20 
_summit_declaration.pdf. 
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II,”99 would produce a framework of fundamental reforms of the 
global financial system created in July 1944 during a three-week 
conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.100  However, while G-
20 leaders took “immediate steps” to stabilize the financial system, to 
use fiscal measures as appropriate to stimulate domestic demand, and 
to help emerging and developing countries gain access to finance; 
reform efforts were limited to agreement upon a set of principles that 
would guide future reform of the financial markets.101 
One of the principles was reforming international financial 
institutions.102  The summit’s leaders declared they were committed to 
reforming the Bretton Woods Institutions in order to give emerging 
and developing countries greater voice and representation.103  
Moreover, the FSF (as well as other major standard-setting bodies) 
had to be expanded “urgently to a broader membership of emerging 
economies.”104  The leaders also called upon the IMF, in collaboration 
with the expanded FSF and other bodies, “to better identify 
vulnerabilities, anticipate potential stresses, and act swiftly to play a 
key role in crisis response.”105  The Action Plan accompanying the 
Declaration set forth measures to be implemented by March 31, 2009, 
as well as in the medium term.106  With respect to reforming 
international financial institutions, the Action Plan, inter alia, called 
upon the FSF and the IMF to conduct “early warning exercises” by 
the March deadline.107 
 
99 See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley et al., Bretton Woods II Still Defines the International 
Monetary System (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14731, 2009). 
100 See, e.g., Howard Davies, Five Ways to Fix Our Financial Architecture, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 23, 2008, at A19 (discussing expectations of reform for the IMF and World 
Bank and principles for regulatory reform); World Leaders Call for New Global Financial 
Architecture, XINHUA FIN. NETWORK NEWS, Oct. 20, 2008 (discussing calls for a new 
financial architecture leading up to the summit); see also Agence France-Presse, World 
Needs New Bretton Woods System, Says UK PM, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 14, 2008 (discussing 
talk of a new Bretton Woods). 
101 G-20, Declaration, supra note 98, at 2. 
102 Id. at 3.  The other principles that would guide policy implementation were: 1) 
strengthening transparency and accountability, 2) enhancing sound regulation, 3) 
promoting integrity in financial markets, and 4) reinforcing international cooperation.  Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 See generally G-20, Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform (Nov. 15, 
2008), http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf. 
107 Id. at 5.  This collaboration anticipates that the IMF will assess macro-financial risks 
and systemic vulnerabilities, while the FSF will assess financial system vulnerabilities, 
drawing on the analyses of its member bodies, including the IMF.  See id.  Where 
appropriate, the IMF and FSF may provide joint risk assessments and mitigation reports.   
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The Declaration’s reference to the FSF was an important one.  
Created in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the FSF 
mandate was to address vulnerabilities in the international financial 
system, identify and oversee action needed to address these 
vulnerabilities, and improve cooperation and information exchange 
among authorities responsible for financial stability.108 
The FSF’s initial members consisted of the finance minister, 
central bank governor, and a supervisory authority from each of the 
G-7 countries, as well as representatives from the IMF, World Bank, 
Bank for International Settlements, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, International Accounting Standards Board, International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors, International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, Committee on Payment and Settlements 
Systems, and Committee on the Global Financial System.109  After its 
creation, the FSF added the European Central Bank, and additional 
national members Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland.110 
A persistent criticism of the FSF was that it excluded developing or 
emerging economies.111  FSF’s chairman Crockett’s explanation for 
this lack of representation was that the FSF could be more effective if 
it was “homogeneous.”112  While that explanation was arguably 
 
Letter from Dominique Strauss Kahn, IMF Managing Dir. & Mario Draghi, FSF 
Chairman, to G-20 Ministers and Governors (Nov. 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_081113.pdf. 
108 See George Walker, A New International Architecture and the Financial Stability 
Forum, in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 119, 130 
(Rosa M. Lastra ed., 2000) (discussing the creation of the FSF).  The FSF’s mandate and 
its organizational structure grew out of a report commissioned by the G-7 in 1998 written 
by Bundesbank President Dr. Hans Tietmeyer.  See HANS TIETMEYER, INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN THE AREA OF FINANCIAL MARKET SUPERVISION 
AND SURVEILLANCE 1 (1999), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org 
/publications/r_9902.pdf.  Tietmeyer presented his report to the G-7 finance ministers and 
central bank governors in February 1999, and the FSF convened for the first time in April 
1999 under Chairman Andrew Crockett.  See Walker, A New International Architecture 
and the Financial Stability Forum, at 128–29 (discussing the creation of the FSF). 
109 Walker, A New International Architecture and the Financial Stability Forum, supra 
note 108, at 129. 
110 See Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New Design for International 
Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 413 n.63 (2007) (listing member states of 
the FSF as of 2007). 
111 See Jason Liberi, Comment, The Financial Stability Forum: A Step in the Right 
Direction . . . Not Far Enough, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 549, 571–74 (2003) 
(discussing criticisms of the FSF). 
112 Id. at 573. 
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defensible in 1999, it clearly lacked legitimacy nearly a decade later 
in the context of a global crisis that emanated from the United States 
and significantly affected emerging and developing economies.  Thus, 
the November summit’s leaders understood that emerging economies 
could no longer remain voiceless in matters relating to the 
international financial system. 
2.  IMF Announcements Prior to the London Summit 
Given the November summit’s March 31, 2009, deadline for 
implementation of various measures to address the crisis and the 
deepening of the crisis itself, constituencies throughout the world 
greatly anticipated the April G-20 summit in London.  However, just 
prior to the summit, two developments, both related to IMF 
conditionality, drew considerable attention. 
First, the IMF announced reforms to its conditionality regime, 
reforms that responded to the critiques of conditionality addressed 
above.113  Recognizing that IMF loans were overloaded with 
conditions that did not focus on the IMF’s core areas of expertise,114 it 
announced that it would rely on “pre-set qualification criteria (ex-ante 
conditionality) where appropriate rather than on traditional (ex-post) 
conditionality.”115  This change in the Fund’s approach to 
conditionality is embodied in a new lending instrument: the Flexible 
Credit Line (FCL).  As stated by the IMF, the FCL is intended for 
countries with very strong fundamentals, policies, and track records 
of policy implementation . . . . FCL arrangements would be 
approved for countries meeting pre-set qualification criteria.  
Access under the FCL would be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  Disbursements under the FCL would not be phased or 
conditioned to policy understandings as is the case under a 
traditional Fund-supported program.116 
Thus far, Mexico,117 Colombia,118 and Poland119 have secured FCL 
arrangements. 
 
113 See supra notes 4–16 and accompanying text. 
114 See Delonis, supra note 60, at 577 (stating that the expansion of the IMF’s 
conditionality, surveillance, and consultations “has generated many criticisms of excessive 
IMF ‘mission creep’ . . . ”). 
115 Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Overhauls Lending Framework, 
(Press Release No. 09/85) (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009 
/pr0985.htm. 
116 Id. 
117 Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Approves US$47 
Billion Arrangement for Mexico Under the Flexible Credit Line (Press Release No. 
09/130) (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09130.htm. 
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Second, in addition to announcing the creation of the FCL, the 
Fund announced that it is discontinuing the use of structural 
performance criteria in all Fund arrangements, opting instead to 
monitor structural policies via program reviews.120  The Fund stated, 
“[w]hile structural reforms will continue to be integral to Fund-
supported programs where needed, their monitoring will be done in a 
way that reduces stigma, as countries will no longer need formal 
waivers if they fail to meet a structural reform by a particular date.”121 
As the IMF’s carefully crafted language indicates, while these 
developments do not eliminate Fund involvement in structural 
transformations of member countries’ economies,122 they do hold 
promise that borrowers will gain more ownership of reform measures. 
3.  The London Summit 
Like the November summit, participants had high hopes during the 
lead up to the London summit.  U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
claimed the summit would launch a “grand bargain” among countries 
that would help end the global recession and set in motion reforms 
that would prevent future crises.123  However, after a reality check, 
particularly with respect to differences between the United States and 
 
118 John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, Remarks at the Seminar, Reshaping 
the Global Financial Landscape: Implications for Asia: Systemic Challenges for Global 
Finance and Priorities for Reform (May 18, 2010) (“Mexico, Columbia, and Poland have 
used the FCL successfully to help stabilize their financial markets during the crisis.”). 
119 Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Approves 
US$20.58 Billion Arrangement for Poland Under the Flexible Credit Line (Press Release 
No. 09/153) (May 6, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09153.htm. 
120 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, FACTSHEET: IMF CONDITIONALITY, 2 (Apr. 
2010) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/conditio.pdf.  “Program 
reviews provide a framework for the Executive Board to assess periodically whether the 
IMF-supported program is broadly on track and whether modifications are necessary for 
achieving the program’s objectives . . . . Reviews normally entail monitoring whether 
agreed targets (conditionality) have been met.”  Id. 
121 Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Overhauls Lending Framework, 
supra note 115. 
122 See Bob David et al., The Word on IMF’s Task in Greece: Herculean, WALL ST. J., 
May 29, 2010, at A8 (“For the International Monetary Fund and its allies . . . the  €110 
billion . . . Greek rescue package is an unprecedented opportunity to remake one of 
Western Europe’s most shuttered and regulated economies.”). 
123 Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Monthly Press Conference (Feb. 19, 2009), 
available at http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/media-centre/latest-news/?view=Speech 
&id=13785689 (describing the “grand bargain”). 
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Europe over additional stimulus measures, participants lowered their 
expectations.124 
Nevertheless, participants concluded the London summit with great 
fanfare, with a number of “announceables” of significance to 
emerging and developing countries.  Through a creative use of 
numbers, the summit leaders declared that, in addition to a fiscal 
stimulus of $5 trillion, they had agreed upon “an additional $1.1 
trillion programme of support to restore credit, growth and jobs in the 
world economy.”125  Recognizing that global recovery must include 
emerging and developing economies—the engines of recent world 
growth—the leaders agreed 1) to triple the resources available to the 
IMF to $750 billion, 2) to support a new SDR allocation of $250 
billion,126 3) to support at least $100 billion of additional lending by 
the multilateral development banks, 4) to ensure $250 billion of 
support for trade finance, and 5) to use additional resources from 
agreed IMF gold sales for concessional finance for the poorest 
countries.127  The leaders also reiterated that they were “determined” 
to reform international financial institutions, such as the IMF, to 
ensure that emerging and developing economies have greater voice 
 
124 See, e.g., Henry Chu, Finance Ministers Promise Action on Global Crisis but Not 
Increased Spending, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com 
/2009/mar/15/world/fg-europe-economy15 (discussing differences between the United 
States and the United Kingdom leading up to the summit); Associated Foreign Press, G20 
Needs to Act: Action on Global Financial Crisis: Analysts, WA TODAY (Austl.), Apr. 1, 
2009, available at http://www.watoday.com.au/world/g20-needs-to-act-action-on-global   
-financial-crisis-analysts-20090401-9jor.html (discussing the divide between United States 
and Europe); Steve Richards, Woolly Words Expose Weakness of Leaders’ Convictions, 
INDEP., Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/steve-richards 
/steve-richards-woolly-words-expose-weakness-of-leaders-convictions-1659990.html 
(discussing Brown’s and Obama’s uncertainties going into the summit). 
125 G-20 London Communiqué, supra note 93, at ¶ II. 
126 This was followed by an additional $33 billion allocation, amounting to a ten-fold 
increase in the outstanding stock of SDRs.  Press Release, International Monetary Fund, 
IMF Governors Formally Approve US$250 Billion General SDR Allocation (Press 
Release No. 09/283) (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009 
/pr09283.htm.  Approximately $110 billion was allocated to emerging markets and 
developing countries, including over $20 billion to low-income countries.  
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE IMF AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LOW INCOME 
COUNTRIES TO BENEFIT FROM IMF ALLOCATION OF SDRS (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/cs/news/2009/CSO82.htm.  SDRs are an important part 
of a member country’s official reserves because, through trading arrangements between 
IMF member countries, they can be exchanged for hard currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, 
euro, yen, or pound sterling.  Id. 
127 G-20, Declaration on Delivering Resources Through the International Financial 
Institutions, 1-2 (2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_IFI_Annex_Draft_02 
_04_09_-__1615_Clean.pdf. 
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and representation.128  The declaration, however, lacked any newly 
agreed upon reforms. 
By contrast, with respect to strengthening financial supervision and 
regulation, the leaders agreed to establish a new Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) as a successor to the FSF.129 
The purpose of the change was to give the FSF “a stronger 
institutional basis,” so that it could more effectively assist and 
collaborate with national authorities, standard setting bodies, and 
international financial institutions in addressing vulnerabilities and 
implementing strong regulatory, supervisory, and other policies in the 
interest of financial stability.130 
Importantly, the membership of the FSB’s Plenary, the decision-
making organ of the body,131 includes the current FSF members, in 
addition to the rest of the G-20, Spain, and the European 
Commission.132  This means that in addition to the FSF’s mandate to 
assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, identify and 
oversee action needed to address them, and promote coordination and 
information exchange among authorities responsible for financial 
stability, emerging economies that are members of the FSB will: 
• Monitor and advise on market developments and their 
implications for regulatory policy; 
• Advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory 
standards; 
• Undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development 
work of the international standard setting bodies to ensure their 
work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities, and addressing 
gaps; 
• Set guidelines for, and support the establishment . . . of . . ., 
supervisory colleges; 
• Support contingency planning for cross-border crisis 
management, particularly with respect to systemically important 
firms; and 
 
128 G-20 London Communiqué, supra note 93, at ¶ 20. 
129 Id. at ¶ 15. 
130 G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, 1 (2009), 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf. 
131 Bank for International Settlements, Financial Stability Forum Re-Established as the 
Financial Stability Board, available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090403.htm. 
132 London Communiqué, supra note 93, at ¶ 15. 
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• Collaborate with the IMF to conduct Early Warning 
Exercises.133 
Thus, emerging economies now have the potential to play an 
integral role in strengthening the global financial system in the 
context of international cooperation (e.g., developing a framework for 
cross-border bank resolution arrangements), prudential regulation 
(e.g., working with accounting standard setters to implement 
recommendations to mitigate pro-cyclicality), and broadening the 
scope of regulation (e.g., developing effective oversight of hedge 
funds).134 
4.  The Pittsburgh Summit 
At the Pittsburgh summit held in September 2009, the participants 
declared that, because of the globally coordinated efforts to stem the 
crisis, the world’s economy was in the “midst of a critical transition 
from crisis to recovery.”135  Accordingly, the summit’s leaders agreed 
to a number of measures of importance to both developed and 
developing countries.  They ranged from “a Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth,”136 to “Strengthening the 
International Financial Regulatory System,”137 to “Energy Security 
and Climate Change.”138 
They also agreed to measures specifically intended to increase the 
voice of emerging and developing countries international financial 
and economic matters.  First, in recognition of the multipolar 
economic world that has developed since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, the leaders agreed to abandon the G-7/8 as the 
principal forum for discussion global economic and financial issues.  
Henceforth, the G-20 will be the “premier forum” for international 
economic cooperation.139 
Second, in response to the drumbeat for governance reform at the 
IMF, the summit leaders made the following statement: 
Modernizing the IMF’s governance is a core element of our effort 
to improve the IMF’s credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness.  We 
recognize that the IMF should remain a quota-based organization 
and that the distribution of quotas should reflect the relative weights 
 
133 G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, supra note 128, at 1. 
134 See G-20 London Communiqué, supra note 93, at ¶ 15. 
135 G-20 Pittsburgh Communiqué, supra note 93, at 1. 
136 Id. at 2. 
137 Id. at 7. 
138 Id. at 13. 
139 Id. at 19. 
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of its members in the world economy, which have changed 
substantially in view of the strong growth in dynamic emerging 
market and developing countries.  To this end, we are committed to 
a shift in quota share to dynamic emerging market and developing 
countries of at least five percent from over-represented to under-
represented countries using the current IMF quota formula as the 
basis to work from.  We are also committed to protecting the voting 
share of the poorest in the IMF.  On this basis and as part of the 
IMF’s quota review . . . we urge an acceleration of work toward 
bringing the review to a successful conclusion.  As part of that 
review, we agree that a number of other critical issues will need to 
be addressed, including: the size of any increase in IMF quotas, 
which will have a bearing on the ability to facilitate change in quota 
shares [and] the size and composition of the Executive Board . . . . 
As part of a comprehensive reform package, we agree that the heads 
and senior leadership of all international institutions should be 
appointed through an open, transparent and merit-based process.  
We must urgently implement the package of IMF quota and voice 
reforms agreed in April 2008.140 
This is a significant statement.  But it does not represent a 
revolution in IMF governance.  As to the quota shift, the BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries pushed for a seven 
percent shift, which would have given developing countries, currently 
holding about forty-four percent of the quotas, a majority share.141  
The proposed shift hardly indicates that the United States and 
European nations have agreed to cede control of the IMF.  Changing 
the composition of the Executive Board is key to giving emerging and 
developing countries greater voice in the Fund’s governance, but 
actually accomplishing a change, such as reducing the over-
representation of European countries on the Board,142 is easier said 
than done.  And while it is significant that there is now a consensus 
 
140 Id. at 11.  The leaders also “stressed the importance of adopting a dynamic formula 
at the World Bank which primarily reflects countries’ evolving economic weight and the 
World Bank’s development mission, and that generates an increase of at least 3% of voting 
power for developing and transition countries, to the benefit of under-represented 
countries.”  Id. at 3. 
141 Five Per Cent Share in IMF is a Compromise Figure: PM, ECON. TIMES (India), 
(Sept 26, 2009), available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/5-share-in-IMF             
-compromise-figure/articleshow/5059158.cms. 
142 “Euro zone member states face pressure to lower their representation at the IMF [to 
just one single IMF seat] to make more room for China and other emerging economies, 
which are playing an increasingly important role in financing the Fund.”  Marcin 
Grajewski, Update 3-Euro Zone Ministers Disagree Over Single IMF Seat, REUTERS (July 
6, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL621322220090706.  However, 
“[e]uro zone finance ministers [disagree] . . . over whether they should have a single 
representation at international financial institutions despite being increasingly willing to 
speak with one voice.”  Id. 
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that choosing the leaders of the IMF and World Bank should be 
accomplished in a transparent and merit-based procedure, it is not 
clear how the process will work in practice.143 
5.  The Seoul Summit 
In November 2010, leaders of the G-20 summit went to Seoul to 
tackle global trade imbalances, currency values—particularly the 
value of the yuan, and financial regulation.  The summit took place 
amid observations that global cooperation to solve economic 
problems had weakened considerably since the first summit and that 
the G-20 was in “serious difficulties.”144  Not surprisingly, then, the 
leaders made little progress with respect to the first two issues, which 
are particularly important to emerging and developing countries.  The 
United States sought to reach agreement on numerical limits for 
current account deficits and surpluses (no more than four percent of 
gross domestic product), but the most the leaders could agree on was 
to formulate “indicative guidelines” to measure “large imbalances that 
require preventive and corrective actions to be taken.”145  Regarding 
currency values and the United States’ view of the undervaluation of 
the yuan, the leaders made the tepid commitment to move “toward 
more market-determined exchange rate systems,” enhance exchange 
rate flexibility, and avoid competitive devaluations.146  As to the last 
 
143 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, EXECUTIVE BOARD PROGRESS REPORT TO 
THE IMFC: THE REFORM OF FUND GOVERNANCE, 3 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/042110a.pdf (noting that while the 2007 
Fund decision on selection of the Managing Director represented an important step in 
establishing a transparent and merit-based process, “the Executive Board recognizes that 
the extent to which a revised framework for the selection of the Managing Director 
succeeds . . . will depend on whether the Fund’s membership is willing to take full 
advantage of it”). 
144 Chris Giles & Christian Oliver, Leaders Pressed to Close Policy Rifts, FIN. TIMES, 
(London), Nov. 10, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/0/6a0d3fba-eb8a-11df      
-bbb5-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=a922e026-ebb5 -11df-bbb5-00144feab49a.html#axzz1 
Bc12RrvN. 
145 The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, November 11–12, 2010, at ¶ 9 
[hereinafter Seoul Summit Declaration] available at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010  
/ 11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf. 
146 Id.  The United States, in fact, was on the defensive because of the U.S. Federal 
Government’s attempt to stimulate the economy by engaging in a $600 billion quantitative 
easing program.  China and other nations blamed the stimulus program for downward 
pressure on the dollar, resulting in destabilizing capital flows to emerging economies.  See 
Norbert Wagner & Michal Machnowski, The G20-Summit in Korea—Reactions from the 
U.S., Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.kas.de/usa/en/publications/ 
21170/.  Accordingly, the summit communiqué stated: “Advanced economies, including 
those with reserve currencies, will be vigilant against excess volatility and disorderly 
movements in exchange rates.  These actions will help mitigate the risk of excessive 
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issue, however, the leaders claimed success in endorsing a “landmark 
agreement reached by the [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision] 
on the new bank capital and liquidity framework . . . .”147  Dubbed 
“Basel III,” the framework addresses the weaknesses of Basel II that 
became evident as a result of the global financial crisis.148  Although 
Basel III is not currently of great significance to the Global South, the 
rules on capital adequacy and liquidity will become increasingly 
important as the banking sectors of emerging and developing 
countries become more sophisticated. 
Although giving emerging and developing economies greater voice 
in global economic and financial affairs was not high on the agenda, 
the Seoul summit resulted in what appeared to be further gains on this 
critical issue, especially with respect to IMF governance.  The gains 
included 1) a shift “in quota shares to dynamic emerging market and 
developing and to under-represented countries of over 6% while 
protecting the share of the poorest,”149 2) a “doubling of quotas, with 
a corresponding rollback of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) 
preserving relative shares,”150 3) “[g]reater representation for 
emerging market and developing countries at the Executive Board 
through two fewer advanced European chairs, and the possibility of a 
second alternate for all multi-country constituencies,”151 and 4) 
“[m]oving to an all-elected Board, along with a commitment by the 
IMF's membership to maintain the Board size at 24 chairs . . . .”152 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IMF’s Managing Director, declared 
that summit leaders' commitments constituted “the most important 
reform in the governance of the institution since its creation.”153  He 
also stated: “We put an end to a discussion which has been in the 
headlines for decades about the legitimacy of the institution.”154  
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India’s finance minister was more circumspect: “The legitimacy of 
the IMF is increasing.”155  The increased legitimacy is reflected in the 
voting power of important emerging economies.  China will become 
the third largest shareholder, behind the United States and Japan.156  
Russia, India, and Brazil will be among the top ten shareholders.157 
Although the reforms are important, one must be cautious about 
claiming that a profound change in favor of emerging economies is 
about to occur at the IMF.  The United States, with approximately 
seventeen percent of the IMF’s voting power, still retains the veto 
over key decisions, which require an eighty-five percent vote.  
Moreover, two-thirds of the six percent quota shift comes from 
developing countries, resulting in only a two percent shift to 
developing countries.158  Ultimately, the proof will be in the pudding.  
The question remains whether the IMF’s operations will reflect the 
voices of emerging and developing countries, even when decisions 
may run contrary to the interests of the United States and other 
developed member countries.159 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the global financial crisis, emerging economies are 
on the verge of acquiring voice—i.e., meaningful and effective 
representation in discourse at key “table[s]” relating to global 
economic and financial affairs.  This has led some to exclaim that we 
are at the threshold of a new New International Economic Order!160 
Part of this new NIEO envisions a reformed IMF.  Prior to the 
crisis, the IMF took steps to improve its governance and 
accountability vis-à-vis emerging and developing economies.  The 
measures were limited, however.  Consequently, the Fund’s clients 
abandoned it.  The Fund was once again on the brink of irrelevance.  
In August 2008, IMF lending totaled SDR 11.65 (approximately 
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$16.65 billion) as compared to SDR 76.84 (approximately $116 
billion) in September 2003, resulting in a significant drop in income 
(because of a drop in interest payments).161  The crisis not only 
revived the IMF, but it also created an opening for emerging 
economies to demand greater voice within the institution.  Moreover, 
emerging economies demanded and obtained representation in fora 
that determine global economic and financial policy, as reflected in 
the shift in global economic policymaking from the G-7 to the G-20 
and the expansion of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) membership 
to include emerging economies. 
These developments must not be overblown, however.  As this 
Article has demonstrated, change in favor of emerging and 
developing countries has come only incrementally.  Much work 
remains for the IMF to achieve governance reforms that will persuade 
its borrowers (and many critical observers) of its legitimacy.162  
Moreover, not all observers believe the reforms are in the best 
interests of emerging and developing countries.163  Even if the 
reforms are worthy, we have yet to see whether they will be effective 
in practice.  For instance, will emerging economies and the G-20 
generally be able to articulate economic policy coherently or is the 
forum too unwieldy?164  And even if emerging economies such as 
China and India exercise their newfound voice, will they represent the 
interests of developing countries or will they be co-opted by the rich 
countries in the club?  Only time will tell. 
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